Configuration
Config
type Config struct {
Timeouts TimeoutConfig
Connection ConnectionConfig
Security SecurityConfig
Retry RetryConfig
Middleware MiddlewareConfig
Defaults RequestDefaults
}The main configuration struct. The five sub-configs and Defaults are all value types. Use DefaultConfig() to obtain secure defaults; the returned Config can have its fields modified directly.
cfg := httpc.DefaultConfig()
cfg.Timeouts.Request = 60 * time.Second
cfg.Retry.MaxRetries = 5
client, err := httpc.New(cfg)TimeoutConfig
type TimeoutConfig struct {
Request time.Duration // Total request timeout (including retries), default 180s
Dial time.Duration // TCP connection timeout, default 10s
TLSHandshake time.Duration // TLS handshake timeout, default 10s
ResponseHeader time.Duration // Wait-for-response-header timeout, default 0 (disabled, relies on context timeout)
IdleConn time.Duration // Idle-connection keep-alive time, default 90s
}| Field | Default | Maximum |
|---|---|---|
| Request | 180s | 30min |
| Dial | 10s | 30min |
| TLSHandshake | 10s | 30min |
| ResponseHeader | 0 | 30min |
| IdleConn | 90s | 30min |
Setting a field to 0 means no timeout (not recommended for production).
TIP
ResponseHeader defaults to 0 (disabled). In this case, TimeoutConfig.Request or WithTimeout() serves as the sole timeout mechanism, ensuring WithTimeout() has full control over request duration. This design suits AI APIs and long-polling scenarios that require extended response times. Set it to a positive value only when you need a transport-layer hard cap (e.g. to defend against Slowloris attacks), but note that this overrides WithTimeout.
ProxyStrategy
type ProxyStrategy = proxypool.Strategy
const (
ProxyStrategyRoundRobin = proxypool.StrategyRoundRobin // Round-robin (default)
ProxyStrategyRandom = proxypool.StrategyRandom // Random
)Proxy-pool selection strategy.
| Constant | Description |
|---|---|
ProxyStrategyRoundRobin | Round-robin (default); each selection advances to the next proxy, so retries naturally land on different IPs |
ProxyStrategyRandom | Random; uniformly selects from healthy proxies |
ConnectionConfig
type ConnectionConfig struct {
MaxIdleConns int // Global max idle connections, default 50
MaxConnsPerHost int // Max connections per host, default 10
ProxyURL string // Proxy address, e.g. "http://proxy:8080"
EnableSystemProxy bool // Auto-detect system proxy, default false
ProxyPool []string // List of proxy servers for rotation
ProxyPoolStrategy ProxyStrategy // Proxy selection strategy, default RoundRobin
ProxyFailureThreshold int // Consecutive-failure threshold, 0 defaults to 3
ProxyCooldown time.Duration // Circuit-break cooldown, 0 defaults to 30s
ProxyRotatePerRequest bool // Force a different proxy for each independent request, default false
ProxyRotateOnStatus []int // HTTP status codes that trigger proxy rotation
EnableHTTP2 bool // Enable HTTP/2, default true
EnableCookies bool // Enable cookie management, default false
EnableDoH bool // Enable DNS-over-HTTPS, default false
DoHCacheTTL time.Duration // DoH cache TTL, default 5min
MaxResponseHeaderBytes int64 // Max response-header bytes, default 0 (uses Go stdlib default 10MB)
}Proxy Pool
ProxyPool specifies a set of proxy servers; requests are distributed among them according to ProxyPoolStrategy. Connection failures (dial/TLS) trigger passive circuit breaking: after accumulating ProxyFailureThreshold failures, the proxy is temporarily removed from rotation and recovers after ProxyCooldown (half-open probing).
Priority: lower than ProxyURL, higher than EnableSystemProxy. If both ProxyURL and ProxyPool are set, ProxyURL takes effect (single-proxy mode).
ProxyRotateOnStatus specifies HTTP status codes that trigger a proxy switch on retry (e.g. []int{403} for CF/WAF IP-based blocking). Unlike connection failures, status-code rotation does not circuit-break the proxy — blocking is often target-specific (a proxy blocked on one site may work fine on another). Requires Retry.MaxRetries > 0 to take effect.
ProxyRotatePerRequest ensures that each independent request (e.g. each Get/Post call) uses a different proxy. When disabled, HTTP connection reuse causes consecutive requests to the same host to reuse the previous request's proxy tunnel, bypassing proxy-pool selection. When enabled, idle connections are closed at the start of each request, forcing the Transport to re-evaluate the proxy pool — this adds a small overhead (no connection reuse) but guarantees per-request rotation. Requires ProxyPool to take effect; has no effect with ProxyURL or when no proxy pool is configured.
TIP
Both are used for proxy rotation, but their trigger mechanisms differ: ProxyRotateOnStatus triggers rotation on retry when a specific status code is received (passive, requires retries), while ProxyRotatePerRequest actively switches the proxy at the start of each request (no retries needed). For scraping/data-collection scenarios targeting the same host, ProxyRotatePerRequest ensures each request has a different source IP.
cfg := httpc.DefaultConfig()
cfg.Connection.ProxyPool = []string{
"http://proxy1:8080",
"http://proxy2:8080",
"http://proxy3:8080",
}
cfg.Connection.ProxyPoolStrategy = httpc.ProxyStrategyRoundRobin
cfg.Connection.ProxyFailureThreshold = 3
cfg.Connection.ProxyCooldown = 30 * time.Second
cfg.Connection.ProxyRotateOnStatus = []int{403}DNS-over-HTTPS
Enable DoH to reduce DNS resolution latency and prevent DNS hijacking:
cfg := httpc.DefaultConfig()
cfg.Connection.EnableDoH = true
cfg.Connection.DoHCacheTTL = 5 * time.MinuteDefault DoH providers (by priority): Cloudflare -> Google -> AliDNS. See Connection Pool for details.
SecurityConfig
type SecurityConfig struct {
TLSConfig *tls.Config // Custom TLS configuration
MinTLSVersion uint16 // Minimum TLS version, default TLS 1.2
MaxTLSVersion uint16 // Maximum TLS version, default TLS 1.3
InsecureSkipVerify bool // Skip certificate verification (testing only)
MaxResponseBodySize int64 // Response body size limit, default 10MB
MaxRequestBodySize int64 // Request body size limit, default 0 (no limit on request body size; unlike MaxResponseBodySize, no automatic fallback)
MaxDecompressedBodySize int64 // Decompressed body size limit, default 100MB
AllowPrivateIPs bool // Allow private IPs, default false
SSRFExemptCIDRs []string // SSRF-exempt CIDRs
ValidateURL bool // URL validation, default true
ValidateHeaders bool // Header validation, default true
StrictContentLength bool // Strict Content-Length, default true
CookieSecurity *CookieSecurityConfig // Cookie security validation
CertificatePinner CertificatePinner // Certificate pinning (SPKI hash/public key), default nil (disabled)
RedirectWhitelist []string // Redirect-whitelist domains
}Certificate Pinning (CertificatePinner)
CertificatePinner enables certificate pinning: the TLS handshake is rejected when the server does not present a pinned key/certificate, defending against man-in-the-middle attacks even if a trusted CA is compromised. Defaults to nil (disabled). Create one with the following constructors:
| Constructor | Description |
|---|---|
NewSPKIHashPinner(hashes ...string) (CertificatePinner, error) | Create from one or more base64-encoded SPKI SHA-256 hashes (most common; supports key rotation) |
NewPublicKeyPinner(publicKeys ...[]byte) (CertificatePinner, error) | Create from DER-encoded PKIX public keys (SHA-256 computed internally) |
NewCertificatePinnerChain(pinners ...CertificatePinner) CertificatePinner | Combine multiple pinners; accepts if any passes |
pinner, err := httpc.NewSPKIHashPinner(
"YLh1dUR9y6Kja30RrAn7JKnbQG/uEtLMkBgFF2fuihg=", // current key
"C5+lpZ7tcVwmwQIMcRtPbsQtWLABXhQzejna0wHFr8M=", // backup key (rotation)
)
if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err)
}
cfg := httpc.DefaultConfig()
cfg.Security.CertificatePinner = pinner
client, err := httpc.New(cfg)WARNING
Certificate pinning requires the pinned value to be updated in sync when the server rotates its certificate (e.g. Let's Encrypt renewal). Pin multiple hashes (current + backup) and establish an update workflow to avoid connection outages caused by key rotation.
WARNING
AllowPrivateIPs defaults to false, blocking connections to private/reserved IPs (127.0.0.1, 10.x, 192.168.x, etc.). Only set it to true when connecting to internal services.
SSRF Exemption Example
cfg := httpc.DefaultConfig()
cfg.Security.SSRFExemptCIDRs = []string{
"10.0.0.0/8", // VPC internal
"100.64.0.0/10", // Tailscale
}RetryConfig
type RetryConfig struct {
MaxRetries int // Max retry count, default 3
Delay time.Duration // Initial retry delay, default 1s
BackoffFactor float64 // Backoff multiplier, default 2.0
EnableJitter bool // Enable jitter, default true
MaxRetryDelay time.Duration // Max retry-delay cap, default 30s
CustomPolicy RetryPolicy // Custom retry policy
}| Field | Default | Range |
|---|---|---|
| MaxRetries | 3 | 0-10 |
| Delay | 1s | 0-30min |
| BackoffFactor | 2.0 | 1.0-10.0 |
| MaxRetryDelay | 30s | 0-30min |
Retry-delay formula: min(Delay * BackoffFactor^attempt + jitter, MaxRetryDelay)
MiddlewareConfig
type MiddlewareConfig struct {
Middlewares []MiddlewareFunc // Middleware list, default nil
}Contains only the middleware chain. Request defaults (User-Agent, default headers, redirect policy) have been moved to RequestDefaults.
RequestDefaults
type RequestDefaults struct {
UserAgent string // User-Agent, default "httpc/1.0"
Headers map[string]string // Default request headers, default empty
FollowRedirects bool // Follow redirects, default true
MaxRedirects int // Max redirect count, default 10
}The canonical location for per-request defaults: User-Agent, default headers, and redirect policy. Obtain sensible defaults via DefaultConfig() and modify as needed.
cfg := httpc.DefaultConfig()
cfg.Defaults.UserAgent = "myapp/2.0"
cfg.Defaults.Headers = map[string]string{"Accept": "application/json"}
cfg.Defaults.MaxRedirects = 5Configuration Presets
DefaultConfig
func DefaultConfig() ConfigSecure default configuration. SSRF protection enabled by default.
SecureConfig
func SecureConfig() ConfigSecurity-first configuration. Shorter timeouts, auto-redirect disabled, strict SSRF protection.
| Setting | Value |
|---|---|
| Request timeout | 15s |
| Dial timeout | 5s |
| TLSHandshake timeout | 5s |
| ResponseHeader timeout | 10s (Slowloris defense) |
| IdleConn timeout | 30s |
| MaxIdleConns | 20 |
| MaxConnsPerHost | 5 |
| MaxResponseBodySize | 5MB |
| MaxRetries | 1 |
| Delay | 2s |
| EnableJitter | true |
| FollowRedirects | false |
PerformanceConfig
func PerformanceConfig() ConfigHigh-throughput configuration. Larger connection pool, longer timeouts, security validation preserved.
TIP
PerformanceConfig keeps ValidateURL and ValidateHeaders enabled for security. For maximum performance in trusted environments, you can manually disable them: cfg.Security.ValidateURL = false, but be aware of the security risks (injection attacks, SSRF).
| Setting | Value |
|---|---|
| Request timeout | 60s |
| Dial timeout | 15s |
| TLSHandshake timeout | 15s |
| ResponseHeader timeout | 0 (disabled, uses Request timeout) |
| IdleConn timeout | 120s |
| MaxIdleConns | 100 |
| MaxConnsPerHost | 20 |
| EnableCookies | true |
| MaxResponseBodySize | 50MB |
| StrictContentLength | false |
| ValidateURL | true |
| ValidateHeaders | true |
| Delay | 500ms |
| BackoffFactor | 1.5 |
| EnableJitter | true |
TestingConfig
func TestingConfig() ConfigTesting-environment configuration. Security checks disabled, short timeouts.
| Setting | Value |
|---|---|
| Dial timeout | 5s |
| TLSHandshake timeout | 5s |
| ResponseHeader timeout | 0 (disabled, uses Request timeout) |
| IdleConn timeout | 30s |
| MaxIdleConns | 10 |
| MaxConnsPerHost | 5 |
| EnableHTTP2 | false |
| EnableCookies | true |
| InsecureSkipVerify | true |
| AllowPrivateIPs | true |
| ValidateURL | false |
| ValidateHeaders | false |
| MaxRetries | 1 |
| Delay | 100ms |
| EnableJitter | false |
| UserAgent | httpc-test/1.0 |
DANGER
This configuration disables TLS verification and SSRF protection. For testing only. Using it outside test environments will print a security warning (see Security Warning Output).
MinimalConfig
func MinimalConfig() ConfigLightweight configuration. Retries and redirects disabled, minimal connection pool.
| Setting | Value |
|---|---|
| Dial timeout | 5s |
| TLSHandshake timeout | 5s |
| ResponseHeader timeout | 0 (disabled, uses Request timeout) |
| IdleConn timeout | 30s |
| MaxIdleConns | 10 |
| MaxConnsPerHost | 2 |
| MaxResponseBodySize | 1MB |
| MaxRetries | 0 |
| Delay | 0 |
| BackoffFactor | 1.0 |
| EnableJitter | false |
| FollowRedirects | false |
Security Warning Output
SetSecurityWarnOutput
func SetSecurityWarnOutput(w io.Writer)Redirects the destination of security-warning output. When you use TestingConfig() or set SecurityConfig.InsecureSkipVerify (Config.Security) to true, httpc prints a [SECURITY WARNING]-level alert to this writer (each type of warning is printed at most once per process). The default output is os.Stderr; pass io.Discard to fully suppress warnings, useful for silencing them in tests or known-safe internal scenarios.
// Suppress security warnings in tests
httpc.SetSecurityWarnOutput(io.Discard)
cfg := httpc.TestingConfig()TIP
This setting is process-level global state that affects all subsequently created clients. The TestingConfig and InsecureSkipVerify warnings are each counted independently (neither affects the other's triggering), but they share the same output writer.
Validation
ValidateConfig
func ValidateConfig(cfg *Config) errorValidates configuration. Called automatically by New(), but can also be called explicitly.
cfg := httpc.DefaultConfig()
cfg.Retry.MaxRetries = 100 // Out of range
if err := httpc.ValidateConfig(&cfg); err != nil {
log.Fatal(err) // invalid retry configuration: Retry.MaxRetries must be 0-10, got 100
}Config.String
func (c *Config) String() stringReturns a safe string representation. ProxyURL credentials are masked, TLSConfig displays as <configured> or <default>, and Headers are not output.
cfg := httpc.DefaultConfig()
fmt.Println(cfg.String())
// Config{Timeouts:{Request: 3m0s, ...}, Security:{TLSConfig: <default>, ...}}Cookie Security
CookieSecurityConfig
type CookieSecurityConfig struct {
RequireSecure bool
RequireHttpOnly bool
RequireSameSite string
AllowSameSiteNone bool
RequireSecureForSameSiteNone bool
}Cookie security-attribute validation configuration.
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| RequireSecure | bool | Require the cookie to have the Secure attribute |
| RequireHttpOnly | bool | Require the cookie to have the HttpOnly attribute |
| RequireSameSite | string | Required SameSite value, e.g. "Strict", "Lax"; empty string means no check |
| AllowSameSiteNone | bool | Whether SameSite=None is allowed |
| RequireSecureForSameSiteNone | bool | Require the Secure attribute when SameSite=None (default true) |
DefaultCookieSecurityConfig
func DefaultCookieSecurityConfig() *CookieSecurityConfigDefault cookie security configuration. Does not require Secure/HttpOnly/SameSite attributes, but enforces that cookies with SameSite=None must have Secure.
StrictCookieSecurityConfig
func StrictCookieSecurityConfig() *CookieSecurityConfigStrict cookie security configuration. Requires Secure, HttpOnly, and SameSite=Strict.
cfg := httpc.DefaultConfig()
cfg.Security.CookieSecurity = httpc.StrictCookieSecurityConfig()